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Abstract 
This paper offers a sympathetic reading of Berkeley’s account of human agency.  The first 
section briefly revisits three options concerning the relationship between human and divine 
agency available to theistically minded philosophers in the medieval and early modern eras. The 
second argues that of those three views only the position of concurrentism is consistent with 
Berkeley’s texts. The third section explores Berkeley’s reasons for adopting concurrentism by 
highlighting three motivating considerations drawn from his larger philosophical system. Finally, 
the fourth section attempts to flesh out Berkeley’s understanding of human activity by looking at 
how we might understand his claim that “we move our legs ourselves” in light of his 
commitments to idealism and concurrentism. 
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Introduction 
 
Berkeley clearly, confidently, and consistently maintains that only spirits can be causes.  In 
doing so, he would appear to distinguish God and finite souls from ideas and “bodies,” with the 
former falling on the active side, and the latter on the passive side of the traditional, if slippery, 
active-passive distinction.
2,3  Nonetheless, Berkeley’s commentators have found his 
characterization of finite souls as active deeply problematic on both textual and philosophical 
grounds.  Many have consequently struggled to interpret him either as a closet Malbranchian 
  1occasionalist,
4 or resigned themselves to reading him as philosophically muddled,
5 or even 
grossly inconsistent,
6 on the issue of human agency.   
In spite of the difficulties that contemporary philosophers have had in making reasonable 
sense of Berkeley’s position, I would like to suggest that there is a rather straightforward reading 
of his view that is historically sensitive, fits squarely with his texts, and is philosophically well-
motivated.  The first section of what follows briefly revisits three options concerning the 
relationship between human and divine agency available to theistically minded philosophers in 
the medieval and early modern eras.  The second argues that of those three views only the 
position of concurrentism is consistent with Berkeley’s texts.  The third section explores 
Berkeley’s reasons for adopting concurrentism, especially as opposed to occasionalism, by 
highlighting three motivating considerations drawn from his larger philosophical system.  
Finally, the fourth section attempts to flesh out Berkeley’s understanding of human activity by 
looking at how we might understand his claim that we move our legs ourselves in light of his 
commitment to both idealism and concurrentism.     
 
Concurrentism, Occasionalism, and Mere Conservationism 
 
For theistic philosophers of the later medieval and early modern periods, discussions of human 
agency took place against a background of views concerning the general relationship between 
God’s ongoing activity and the activity, if any, of his creatures.  A fundamental tension 
bedeviled attempts to find a suitable balance between divine and creaturely contributions.  In 
general, piety pulled the faithful in the direction of maximizing God’s activity even at the cost of 
construing the contribution of finite creatures in ever more passive terms.  The felt need to 
  2preserve the independence of creatures and provide robust grounds for explanations in natural 
philosophy, however, pulled in the opposite direction, often encouraging even the most devout to 
reserve at least some active powers for created beings.  Three main views—in countless 
variations—emerged in response to this fundamental tension, each suggesting a different balance 
between divine and creaturely activity.
7  
Divine concurrentism represents a relatively moderate solution to the fundamental 
problem of how to distribute the activity of the world between God and his creatures.  At the 
heart of concurrentism can be found three foundational commitments:   
 
First, concurrentists maintain that God’s activity is not merely required to create the 
world but also to conserve it in its existence.  Indeed, they generally adopt the traditional 
view that God works through the very same activity in both creating and conserving the 
world.
8  It is perhaps worth noting that the doctrine of divine conservation, like the 
doctrine of creation itself, was in no way unique to divine concurrentism, and could be 
denied in earlier eras only by those willing to positively invite charges of heresy.     
 
Second, concurrentists insist that creatures are endowed with genuine active and passive 
powers, and that they exercise their powers in ordinary causal interactions.  
Concurrentists thus explicitly commit themselves to the view that creatures make genuine 
causal contributions to the non-miraculous unfolding of events in nature.  In this way 
they hope to provide the causal grounds that they take to be necessary for natural science 
and human responsibility.     
 
  3Third, and most distinctively, concurrentists maintain that although creatures are 
endowed with genuine causal powers, no creaturely causal power could be efficacious in 
bringing about its appropriate effects without God’s active general assistance, or 
“concurrence.”  Consequently, concurrentists maintain, for example, that when my hands 
are placed near a fire they are warmed not simply by the causal powers of the fire, but by 
the causal powers of the fire working in concert with God’s active assistance.   
Although often overlooked today, concurrentism enjoyed the status of a default position for 
many in the medieval and early modern periods.  It could count among its defenders Albert the 
Great and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century,
9 Luis de Molina and Francisco Suarez in 
the sixteenth,
10 and Robert Boyle and Gottfried Leibniz in the seventeenth.
11  In spite of its 
impressive lineage, however, concurrentism did not, of course, enjoy universal assent.  It was 
attacked on both sides, with “mere conservationists” arguing that it assigns too large a role to 
God’s activity in the causal unfolding of the world, and occasionalists arguing that it assigns too 
small a role to God’s activity.  Both of these alternative views can be seen as abandoning a 
foundational commitment of concurrentism.   
Mere conservationism embraces a distribution of causal activity that is tilted somewhat 
more in favor of created agents than is suggested by concurrentism.  In essentials, it can be 
arrived at by adopting the first two tenets listed above, while denying the third.  Thus mere 
conservationists agree that God’s activity is necessary for both the creation and conservation of 
finite beings.  Furthermore they agree that God creates and conserves creatures complete with 
their own active powers and that those powers are exercised in ordinary causal interactions.  
What mere conservationists deny is that, having been created and conserved, creatures require 
any further assistance on God’s part in order for them to successfully bring about their ordinary 
  4effects.  Thus, for example, according to mere conservationists, while the continued existence of 
the fire and my hands presupposes God’s conserving activity, the fire alone is the immediate 
active cause of the warming of my hands.   
In spite of its elegance and contemporary appeal, mere conservationism has historically 
attracted few supporters.
 12  It was assailed by its opponents on broadly philosophical grounds as 
being at root incoherent.  Thus, for example, Suarez argues that mere conservationism would 
commit one to an untenable position according to which: (i) The power by which God creates 
creatures and their powers is equivalent to the power by which he conserves them; (ii) God’s 
activity is necessary for the conservation of creatures and their powers; but (iii) God’s activity is 
not necessary for the production, or creation, of the effects of secondary causes.  In short, Suarez 
thus objects that the mere conservationist must paradoxically hold that although God creates and 
sustains through one and the same activity, God’s activity is required for the maintenance, but 
not the creation, of creaturely effects.
13  
Mere conservationism was also attacked by its opponents on more purely theological 
grounds.  Perhaps the most crucial objection raised was simply that a greater role could be 
assigned to God’s activity in the causal unfolding of the world, and therefore that piety demands 
that such a greater role actually be assigned.
14  To this rather bald argument could be added 
considerably more subtle theological considerations.  It was objected, for example, that mere 
conservationism runs into trouble in connection with what were known as contra naturam 
miracles.  In his De potentia Aquinas had claimed that such miracles occur “when there remains 
in nature a disposition that is contrary to the effect which God produces, as when he kept the 
young men unharmed in the furnace even though the power to incinerate them remained in the 
fire, and as when the waters of Jordan stood still even though gravity remained in them.”
15  
  5Picking up on Aquinas’s definition, and often using his very examples, concurrentists argued that 
mere conservationists were committed to the impious view that in performing contra naturam 
miracles God would have to actively oppose his own creatures rather than merely withhold his 
assistance.  It was better to maintain, they claimed, that God for example prevented the young 
men from being consumed by the flames of Nebuchadnezzar’s furnace by withholding his 
concurrence, rather than by actively opposing the natural powers of the fire itself.
16
Occasionalism, lying at the opposite end of the spectrum from mere conservationism, 
would tip the distribution of activity between God and his creatures completely in favor of the 
divine.  If mere conservationism can be thought of as the result of denying the third principle of 
concurrentism, occasionalism can be thought of as the result of denying its second principle.  
Thus occasionalists maintain that God not only creates and conserves the world, but is, indeed, 
its only genuine causal power.
17  Apparent secondary causes serve merely as the occasions of 
God’s causal activity.  Thus, for example, occasionalists maintain that the fire does not warm my 
hands in virtue of its own active powers, but rather serves merely as the occasional “cause” of 
God’s directly warming my hands when they are placed near it.     
Although treated dismissively by Aquinas and many later scholastics,
18 occasionalism 
received a significant boost in the early modern period from the Cartesian attack on scholastic 
ontology and natural philosophy as well as from its sophisticated defense by Nicholas 
Malebranche.
19  Nonetheless it would be a mistake to suppose that occasionalism supplanted 
concurrentism as the default view among philosophers outside of Cartesian circles.  To many, the 
suggestion that God alone actively brings about every effect in the natural world seemed simply 
fantastic and smacked of the perpetually miraculous.  To this sense of general disbelief were 
added more focused criticisms that called into question the philosophical and theological merits 
  6of occasionalist doctrines especially as when applied to the case of finite minds or spirits.  Thus 
Leibniz, for example, argues that activity is an essential characteristic of substance in general, 
and therefore without activity finite spirits would fail to qualify as substances in their own right, 
and would collapse into mere modifications of God.
20 To this reductio ad Spinozism, Leibniz 
further argues that denying activity to finite minds would undermine their claim to being genuine 
agents endowed with free will, and thus ultimately would undermine the possibility of their 
being responsible for their own actions and the project of theodicy itself.
21  
More could, of course, be said about the relative merits and deficiencies of 
concurrentism, conservationism, and occasionalism.  What is important for our purposes, 
however, is simply to recall the background against which Berkeley’s own thinking about human 
activity takes place, and to recognize that although concurrentism might often be overlooked as a 
possible position today, no one in Berkeley’s day could have failed to recognize it as a serious 
option.  Indeed, in the next section, I’d like to suggest not only that Berkeley’s texts clearly 
indicate his awareness of concurrentism as a possible position, but also that reading him as a 
concurrentist provides the most coherent understanding of the various things he says about 
human agency.   
 
Concurrentism:  The Textual Case 
 
The first difficulty one faces in coming to grips with Berkeley’s position on human agency is 
simply reconciling the seemingly contradictory pronouncements he makes on the topic.  An 
important clue in addressing this challenge can be found in a number of passages in which 
Berkeley clearly indicates that he is—at the very least—well aware of concurrentism as a 
  7possible position to take with respect to secondary causation.
22  The most striking of those 
passages occurs at Principles 145, where Berkeley tells us point blank, “I perceive several 
motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents 
like my self, which accompany them, and concur in their production” (emphasis added).  As is 
clear from the larger context—the next section emphasizes that God alone is responsible for “the 
far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us”—the concurrence Berkeley has in 
mind here is a cooperative action produced by God working in concert with finite spirits.  The 
passage thus, at a minimum, provides us with a first bit of textual evidence that Berkeley was 
well aware of the concurrentist alternative to mere conservationism and occasionalism.   
Another relevant passage occurs earlier in the same work in the context of Berkeley’s 
rejection of the view that non-spirits might be genuine secondary causes.  Having argued that 
“the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only a mark or sign 
with the thing signified,” he tells us at Principles 66:  
<ext> 
Hence it is evident, that those things which under the notion of a cause co-operating or 
concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great 
absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned 
them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information.  (emphasis 
added) 
</ext> 
In this passage Berkeley is first and foremost concerned with establishing a negative point, 
namely, that ideas are merely signs of other ideas, and not—as we might have otherwise 
supposed—concurrent causes of other ideas.  While the Berkeleyan thesis that idea-idea 
  8causation is always occasional is beside the point for our immediate concerns, it is nonetheless 
telling that the position that Berkeley finds it most natural to resist here is one according to 
which non-spirits are concurrent causes of their effects.  Once again, whatever else one might 
make of the passage, it thus at least indicates that Berkeley was well aware of concurrentism as a 
standard view to be adopted or rejected.     
  A final passage worth calling attention to is to be found in the Second Dialogue, where 
Hylas—providing opposition to Berkeley’s own view—attempts to clarify his position on the 
causal activity of matter, stating:   
<ext> 
But I am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning.  I would by no means be 
thought to deny that God or an Infinite Spirit is the supreme cause of all things.  All I 
contend for, is, that subordinate to the supreme agent there is a cause of a limited and 
inferior nature, which concurs in the production of our ideas, not by any act of will or 
spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to matter, viz. motion.  
(Dialogues, 2:217) 
</ext> 
Philonous, speaking for Berkeley, is short in his reply, retorting to Hylas “you are at every turn 
relapsing into your old exploded conceit, of a moveable and consequently an extended substance 
existing without the mind” (Dialogues, 2:217).  Berkeley’s leading point is thus once again 
negative, and directed at the very possibility of non-spirit causes.  In Hylas’s remarks, however, 
we nonetheless see once again clear positive evidence of Berkeley’s awareness of concurrentism 
as a standard available position to take with respect to creaturely causation.    
  9  Berkeley’s awareness of concurrentism as a live option with respect to creaturely 
causation provides an important clue for understanding his more famous remarks on human 
agency.  One striking passage that has figured heavily in recent treatments of Berkeley’s position 
is drawn from his private notebooks:   
<ext>    
Strange impotence of men.  Man without God.  Wretcheder than a stone or tree, he 
having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power 
at all.  (N, 107)  
<ext> 
This dramatic passage has often been invoked in support of attributing occasionalism to Berkeley 
since it so clearly emphasizes that humans would be impotent without God’s activity.  In fact, 
however, the passage is neutral between either an occasionalist or a concurrentist reading of 
Berkeley since both occasionalists and concurrentists agree that God’s active assistance is a 
necessary condition for secondary causes to succeed in bringing about their natural effects. 
While the wretcheder-than-a-stone passage thus fails to support occasionalism over 
concurrentism, it does help to rule out Berkeley’s adoption of mere conservationism.  Recall that 
the mere conservationist holds that the ordinary activities of secondary causes are beholden to 
God’s assistance only insofar as God is needed to preserve creatures in being.  The wretcheder-
than-a-stone passage, however, commits Berkeley to a stronger position since it implies that 
people would be wretched without God’s help, not because they would cease to exist, but 
because while still existing their wills would cease to be efficacious.  (Indeed, non-existing 
people could hardly be thought to be wretched by dint of their impotent wills.)  This bit of 
textual evidence gains further support from Berkeley’s exchange of letters with Samuel Johnson.  
  10There Berkeley summarily dismisses the position of the chief proponent of mere conservationism 
in the middle ages, Durandus de St. Pourçain, following the familiar concurrentist strategy of 
implying that his view collapses into deism (Works, 2:280).
 23  Viewed in their appropriate 
historical contexts, these texts therefore give good evidence that—as we might have expected 
anyway—Berkeley had no truck with mere conservationism with respect to finite wills. 
Another short, but striking passage, from Berkeley’s notebooks has also figured 
prominently in the interpretation of his position on human agency:   
<ext> 
We move our Legs our selves.  ‘tis we that will their movement.  Herein I differ from 
Malbranch.  (N, 548) 
</ext> 
In light of the often assumed occasionalism of the wretcheder-than-a-stone passage, 
contemporary commentators have typically responded to this seemingly unequivocal statement 
of anti-occasionalism in either of two ways.  On the one hand, there are those who have 
downplayed its significance in hopes of nonetheless reading Berkeley as a committed 
occasionalist.  Thus, for example, George Pitcher after citing the move-our-legs-ourselves 
passage and conceding its anti-occasionalism, nonetheless attempts to diffuse its importance by 
insisting that in “the great published works, however, things are different.”
24  On the other hand, 
there are those who have emphasized the move-our-legs-ourselves passage and its apparent 
inconsistency with the wretcheder-than-a-stone passage in arguing that Berkeley’s position on 
human agency is at root incoherent.  Thus, for example, Nicholas Jolley, after citing both 
passages, remarks apropos of the latter that “Berkeley’s departure from strict occasionalism is 
  11something of a puzzle, for in terms of philosophical consistency, it seems to represent a change 
for the worse.”
25   
Although charitably intentioned, the attempt to treat the move-our-legs-ourselves passage 
as a passing anomaly faces overwhelming textual opposition.  Berkeley repeatedly insists not 
only in the notebooks, but also in “the great published works,” that human wills are genuinely 
active secondary causes.  Thus, for example, in the Principles, Berkeley, in contrasting the 
activity of the human will in conjuring up its own thoughts with the mind’s passive reception of 
sensory ideas, writes: 
<ext> 
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I 
think fit.  It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy:  
and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another.  This making and 
unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active.  Thus much is certain, 
and grounded on experience.  (Principles, 1:28) 
</ext> 
The activity of the human will is likewise asserted in The Dialogues, as for example in the 
following passage where Berkeley, speaking through Philonous, subtly distinguishes between 
our activity with respect to the movements of our bodies and our passivity with respect to the 
sensory perceptions which we experience as a result of those movements: 
<ext> 
The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions, so far forth as volition is 
included in them. . . .In plucking this flower, I am active, because I do it by the motion of 
my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my 
  12nose….I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than 
otherwise, is the effect of my volition.  But neither can this be called smelling:  for if it 
were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner. . . . Smelling then is somewhat 
consequent to all this. . . .Whatever more there is, as that I perceive such a particular 
smell or any smell at all, this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether 
passive.  (Dialogues, 1:196) 
</ext> 
The move-our-legs-ourselves passage is admittedly remarkable in the crispness of its rejection of 
occasionalism as well as in the way in which it explicitly ties that rejection to Malebranche by 
name.
26  The stance it expresses, however, is hardly unique either to it, or to the Notebooks.
27  
For better or for worse, Berkeley wishes to distance his own view from occasionalism, and any 
interpretation that aims to account for what Berkeley actually said cannot afford to simply ignore 
the thick streak of anti-occasionalism in his writings.     
Recent interpretations that attribute outright inconsistency to Berkeley are thus a step in 
the right direction insofar as they take seriously both sides of his complex attitude towards 
human activity.  They are overly hasty, however, in assuming that the passages in which 
Berkeley is at pains to emphasize our dependence on God’s assistance are in insurmountable 
tension with the equally important passages in which he takes care to emphasize our causal 
contribution to our own actions.  Taking the wretcheder-than-a-stone passage as representative of 
the former set of texts, we have seen that while it is inconsistent with mere conservationism, it is 
nonetheless perfectly consistent with either an occasionalist or a concurrentist view of human 
agency.  Taking the move-our-legs ourselves passage as representative of the latter set of texts, 
we can now see that while it is inconsistent with occasionalism, it is nonetheless perfectly 
  13consistent with either concurrentism or mere conservationism.  A consistent interpretation of 
Berkeley’s texts is thus readily available if we understand him as belonging to the hoary tradition 
of divine concurrentism.  Texts such as the wretcheder-than-a-stone passage may thus be 
recognized as asserting the concurrentist commitment to God’s active assistance being a 
necessary condition for the efficaciousness of creaturely activity, while texts such as the move-
our-legs-ourselves passage may be understood as asserting the concurrentist commitment to the 
genuine causal contribution of secondary agents.  There is no need to attribute inconsistency, or 
even vacillation, to Berkeley’s views on the activity of finite minds.  
 
Concurrentism:  The Philosophical Case 
 
If the first difficulty in coming to grips with Berkeley’s account of human agency is finding a 
coherent interpretation of his texts, the second challenge has traditionally been to understand 
why he should have been drawn—perhaps reluctantly—to the position he adopts.  This second 
challenge, I think, loses some of its urgency once it is recognized that Berkeley held consistently 
to a concurrentist position.  Certainly, if the reading offered above is correct, no special account 
can be demanded for why Berkeley changed his mind, or why he was pulled in opposite 
directions, with respect to the activity of the will.  Nor is there anything especially puzzling 
about Berkeley’s finding concurrentism an attractive position.  Presumably many of the same 
reasons that motivated generations of theistically minded philosophers in the medieval and early 
modern eras to adopt concurrentism resonated with Berkeley as well.  Nonetheless, given the 
contemporary tendency to suppose that Berkeley should have embraced occasionalism with 
respect to finite minds, it might be helpful to underscore three considerations drawn from his 
  14larger philosophical system that give him particular reasons for favoring concurrentism over 
occasionalism.  Highlighting those philosophical motivations should serve to further support the 
case for Berkeley’s commitment to concurrentism, and help to expose how deeply that 
commitment is enmeshed in his general metaphysics and epistemology.   
The first such consideration arises immediately from what might be called “Berkeley’s 
Dualism.”
28  Berkeley takes it as a non-negotiable truth that the distinction between activity and 
passivity coincides with the distinction between spirits and ideas.  As is perhaps not 
inappropriate for such a foundational commitment, he insists that both the connection between 
spirit and activity as well as the connection between idea and passivity are readily apparent upon 
reflection.  Thus, for example, in the Dialogues, he suggests that it is simply inconceivable that 
anything other than a spirit might be an active cause of ideas.  With Philonous as his spokesman, 
he announces “I desire to know in the first place, whether . . .  you can conceive any action 
besides volition:  and ... lastly, whether having considered the premises, you do not perceive that 
to suppose any efficient or active cause of our ideas other than spirit, is highly absurd and 
unreasonable?” (Dialogues, 2:217; see also N, 155, 499, 499a, 850).  The correlative connection 
is insisted upon with no less conviction.  Thus, for example, in the Principles, Berkeley 
announces that “A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies 
passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do any thing, or, 
strictly speaking, to be the cause of any thing” (Principles, 25).   
Beyond these appeals to brute intuition, Berkeley also maintains that the alignment of the 
active-passive distinction and the spirit-idea distinction can be established on experiential 
grounds.  In Alciphron, Berkeley insists “though you should tell me that man is inactive, and that 
the sensible objects act upon him, yet my own experience assures me of the contrary. I know I act 
  15. . . ” (7:19, emphasis added).  Experience, Berkeley maintains, is likewise sufficient to establish 
the connection between ideas on the one hand and passivity on the other.  At Principles 25, he 
reports:   
<ext> 
All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they 
may be distinguished, are visibly inactive, there is nothing of power or agency included 
in them.  So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce, or make any alteration in 
another.  To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare 
observation of our ideas.  For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it 
follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived.  But whoever shall attend to 
his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; 
there is therefore no such thing contained in them.  
</ext> 
By drawing either on reflection or experience, Berkeley thus thinks we can establish beyond 
question that all spirits must be active and all ideas essentially passive.  The divide between 
active spirits and passive ideas in this way constitutes a fundamental plank in Berkeley’s 
groundfloor metaphysics.  It is a dualistic division that is every bit as deep in his system as the 
distinction between mind and body is in Descartes’s.
29   
It must be admitted that it is somewhat difficult today to feel the force of Berkeley’s 
arguments for his own brand of dualism, or for that matter to even evaluate their strength and 
cogency.  Certainly the intuition that only spirits can be active will be absent for many 
contemporary philosophers, and one might well be at a loss as to how to even begin to recreate 
the experiences to which Berkeley appeals.
30  The tenability of Berkeley’s dualism, however, is 
  16less important for our purposes than is his staunch commitment to it.  For given that 
commitment, it is rather easy to see why he should have favored a concurrentist account of finite 
spirits over an occasionalist account.  Put positively, by treating finite spirits as concurrent 
causes Berkeley can safely place human souls on the side of God and the angels as genuine 
active beings and distinguish them from purely passive ideas.
31  Put negatively, given his 
dualism, an occasionalist account of finite spirits would threaten to group human souls together 
with passive ideas, and oppose them to God—the only genuinely active being in the world.  
Berkeley’s dualism thus provides him with a powerful reason for preferring a concurrentist 
account of finite minds to an occasionalist account.    
The second consideration is now close to hand.  Like many philosophers before him, 
Berkeley maintains that resemblance, or similarity, is a necessary condition for representation 
(Principles, 140).  This not uncommon semantic thesis, when combined with Berkeley’s 
dualism, leads him to the surprising conclusion that, strictly speaking,
 32 our ideas can in no way 
represent spirits:    
<ext> 
By the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this 
alone, constitutes the signification of that term.  If therefore it is impossible that any 
degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea 
of a spirit.  (Principles, 138; see also Principles, 27) 
</ext> 
Berkeley’s views on representation, when paired with his fundamental metaphysics, thus 
threaten a kind of semantic skepticism with respect to other spirits, whether finite or divine.  If 
all ideas are passive, all spirits are active, and nothing passive can represent anything active, then 
  17it follows that by using our ideas we cannot even so much as think about other spirits.  Indeed, 
even more strikingly, it follows that we cannot even use ideas to think about our own 
fundamental natures insofar as they surpass a mere collection of ideas.       
Berkeley’s solution to this impasse rests squarely on his famous—or perhaps notorious—
doctrine of notions.  Very briefly, Berkeley holds that we enjoy two modes of experience: one 
corresponding to sensory perception, one corresponding to reflection on the mind’s own 
operations.
33  Whereas the first mode of experience yields passive ideas capable of representing 
other ideas, the second mode yields notions capable of representing active beings.  In keeping 
with his views on representation, Berkeley maintains that notions draw their capacity for 
representing active beings from the fact that they are derived from reflection on our own active 
natures.  He thus maintains that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that 
sense is the image or idea of them,” and that “all the notion I have of God, is obtained by 
reflecting on my own soul . . . [and] I have therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in my self 
some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity” (Principles, 140; Dialogues, 3:231–232).  
Semantic skepticism of active natures is thus avoided through the doctrine of notions.  Although 
no passive idea, according to Berkeley, could possibly represent an active spirit, a notion that is 
derived from an active nature is capable of serving as an object of thought about active natures.    
While Berkeley’s doctrine of notions has many subtle consequences for his general 
epistemology, its implications for our present concerns are relatively straightforward.  Pushed 
towards semantic skepticism with respect to spirits by his commitment to dualism and a 
resemblance theory of representation, Berkeley suggests that reflection on our own active natures 
provides us with the resources to form thoughts about active natures more generally.  But crucial 
to this maneuver, of course, is the supposition that our natures are themselves active!  If I, for 
  18example, were not myself a genuine, active, secondary cause, Berkeley maintains, then I could 
not even form a thought about other finite spirits, or more importantly, about God himself.  Thus 
insofar as concurrentism allows Berkeley to treat created sprits—including ourselves—as 
genuine, active, secondary causes, rather than as the mere occasional causes of God’s lone 
activity, his semantic views provide him with another significant reason for preferring 
concurrentism with respect to finite minds over occasionalism.   
A third consideration, although it provides perhaps a less decisive reason for Berkeley’s 
favoring concurrentism over occasionalism, nonetheless helps to bring out how deeply 
concurrentist thinking is woven into Berkeley’s larger philosophical outlook.  Even supposing 
that Berkeley’s appeal to notions provides him with sufficient resources for resisting semantic 
skepticism with respect to spirits, a further worry remains concerning our knowledge of spirits.  
Berkeley maintains that the threat of epistemological skepticism is easily turned away in the case 
of self-knowledge and knowledge of the divine.  He not implausibly maintains that each of us 
enjoys an immediate, non-inferential awareness of our own existence, which serves as an 
unshakeable foundation for self-knowledge (see, for example, Principles, 89).  He further holds 
that we may justifiably infer the existence of God from the “constant regularity, order, and 
concatenation of natural things” as well as from the fact that we are subject to “ideas or 
sensations perceived by us, [but that] are not produced by, or dependent on the wills of men” 
(Principles, 146).  In this way, our knowledge of God’s existence is likewise supposed to be put 
on firm epistemological foundations.   
The case of other finite minds, however, so far remains precarious.  Berkeley maintains 
that we “have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of 
other finite spirits” (Dialogues, 3:233; see also Principles, 147 and Alciphron, 4:5).  We are thus 
  19forced to infer their existence from the perceptions of which we do have an immediate 
awareness.  But how could such ideas ever give us evidence of a world of finite beings 
independent of ourselves?  Berkeley’s clever response in effect puts a novel twist on the problem 
of evil:  our experience of some irregularities and imperfections in the flow of ideas can only be 
accounted for by supposing that God accommodates himself to the wills of imperfect finite 
minds.  Lorne Falkenstein elegantly puts the argument as follows: 
<ext> 
[A]mong our ideas of reality there are some, those of the motions of animate bodies, 
which exhibit a degree of irregularity, inconstancy of purpose, greed, stupidity, and sheer 
perversity which is simply inconsistent with the notion that these ideas are produced by a 
wise and benevolent being.  One plausible way to deal with these phenomena is to 
postulate that there exist certain other spirits whose wills the divine spirit is disposed to 
indulge when moving animate bodies. . . . It is in this way that we deduce the existence of 
other minds “from their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us.”
34  
</ext> 
Considered in isolation Berkeley’s solution to the problem of other (finite) minds appears to be 
consistent with either a concurrentist or an occasionalist treatment of finite souls.  Certain 
imperfections in the pattern of ideas could arise either because God accommodates himself to 
concurrent causes or to occasional causes.  Taken by itself, Berkeley’s solution to the problem of 
other minds therefore cannot be counted as a compelling reason for embracing one of these 
doctrines over the other.  Nonetheless, an important motivation emerges when Berkeley’s 
solution is considered in conjunction with his views on human responsibility.   
  20In the Dialogues, Berkeley has Philonous insist against Hylas that genuine activity is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for responsibility (Dialogues, 3:236–237).  The thesis that 
genuine agency is essential to moral responsibility is stated even more explicitly in Alciphron: 
<ext> 
It should seem, therefore, that, in the ordinary commerce of mankind, any person is 
esteemed accountable simply as he is an agent. And, though you should tell me that man 
is inactive, and that the sensible objects act upon him, yet my own experience assures me 
of the contrary. I know I act, and what I act I am accountable for. And, if this be true, the 
foundation of religion and morality remains unshaken. (7:19) 
</ext> 
Through his account of moral responsibility Berkeley’s concurrentism gets woven into his 
solution to the problem of other (finite) minds.  Berkeley must concede that God could be the 
sole cause of all of our perceptions.  Nonetheless, he insists that at least some of the 
imperfections we experience in the flow of ideas cannot be morally attributed to God.  Those 
imperfections thus give us grounds for postulating other beings that are to be held morally 
accountable for certain sub-optimalities in the world.  But not just any beings will do here 
according to Berkeley.  For such beings to be morally responsible, they must be genuine finite 
agents that enjoy “the use of limited powers . . . immediately under the direction of their own 
wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions” (Dialogues, 3:237).  In 
short, the relevant imperfections of the world must have as their source genuine secondary 
causes, not mere occasions for God’s activity.  It is this further element that underpins 
Berkeley’s claim (noted above) that “I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of 
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concur in their production” (Principles, 145, emphasis added; see also Principles, 148).    
 
Moving Our Legs Ourselves 
 
The textual and philosophical considerations adduced thus far suggest that Berkeley must break 
with strict occasionalism by assigning at least some genuine activity to finite minds.  They do 
not, however, specify how far that activity must extend.  For all that has been argued, Berkeley 
could have adopted a position just short of strict occasionalism, indeed, a position that might 
appropriately be called “almost-occasionalism.”  According to such a view the activity of finite 
minds would consist merely in their being immediate concurrent causes of their own volitions, 
perhaps together with ideas of imagination, with those volitions and imaginations in turn serving 
as occasional causes for God’s direct causal intervention in bringing about whatever 
consequences might follow from them.  Such a position would represent a minimal model of 
human agency consistent with Berkeley’s insistence on human agents being genuine secondary 
causes; it would differ from a letter-of-the-law occasionalism only in its explicit 
acknowledgement of the causal powers agents have in virtue of being able to form volitions and 
conjure fantasies.   
  Although Berkeley certainly could have adopted a position such as almost-occasionalism, 
there are, as we have seen, numerous passages which suggest that he is inclined towards a more 
ambitious picture of human agency, including those in which he claims that “we move our legs 
ourselves;” that “In plucking this flower, I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand;” 
that “I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is . . . an effect immediately 
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is a “power of moving bodies . . . since our mind at will can stir and stay the movements of our 
limbs” (N, 548; Dialogues, 1:196; Dialogues, 2:218f; De motu, 25).  Having focused thus far on 
placing Berkeley in the concurrentist tradition on the basis of some otherwise puzzling texts and 
the philosophical demands of his system, we might in this last section explore—perhaps a bit 
more speculatively—whether Berkeley is entitled to suggest that we may enjoy an immediate 
and direct causal influence over not only our volitions and imaginings, but also over our bodies 
and limbs.  Towards that end, let us consider four prima facie worries that might be thought to 
stand in the way of Berkeley’s embracing a more ambitious model of human agency than is 
suggested by almost-occasionalism.   
  (1)  The traditional concurrentist framework for thinking about creaturely activity was 
hammered out by later scholastics in the context of an ontology very different from Berkeley’s 
idealism.  A first worry, or really source of worries, therefore arises concerning the general 
compatibility of that framework with Berkeley’s metaphysics.  Although this is not the place to 
fret over the finer details of traditional concurrentism and potential objections to it, it might 
nonetheless be helpful to show, in at least a preliminary way, how Berkeley could fairly assume 
three of the most central theses of his scholastic predecessors.   Doing so should help to show 
that nothing about the conjunction of concurrentism and idealism per se forces Berkeley towards 
an almost-occasionalist model of human agency.
35
First, later scholastics in the concurrentist tradition insisted on the importance of 
distinguishing—at least conceptually—between the order of creation-conservation and the order 
of concurrence.  As noted in the opening section, they traditionally held that God brings creation 
into being ex nihilo, and—barring annihilation—preserves that original being per se.
36  This act 
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to the order of concurrence through which God lends his active assistance to the causal powers of 
created substances in bringing about their ordinary effects.  For the scholastics, my creation and 
conservation are thus treated as necessary conditions for my having a nature capable of 
contributing to the movement of my legs, while God’s concurrence is understood as an 
additional or further necessary condition for my causal powers bringing about their ordinary 
effects.  Whether or not one is sympathetic with these standard theological distinctions, it should 
be granted that they are no less tenable in the context of Berkeley’s idealism.
37  Berkeley may, 
with as much right as his scholastic predecessors, insist that God’s creation and conservation of 
finite minds and their perceptions—whether those perceptions are treated as mere modifications 
or as reified entities—are necessary conditions for the causal activity of creatures within the 
order of nature, and that God’s concurrence is to be thought of as an additional or further act 
through which God contributes his active assistance to the causal powers of created minds. 
Second, turning more fully to the order of nature, and thus to the order of concurrence 
itself, later scholastics insisted that we should think of God’s concurrence with a finite agent as 
producing a unified effect through a unified action.  For if the effect were somehow divided or 
conjunctive, the secondary agent might just as well be thought to be a non-concurrent cause of 
one of the conjuncts and an occasional cause of the other.  Thus, to take a facile example, it 
would be obviously foolish to suggest that God and I concur in moving my legs by me moving 
my left leg and by God moving my right leg.  Similarly, the ways in which two agents might be 
said to bring about a unified effect through distinct actions seem in general to be unsuitable as 
accounts of the cooperative action between God and his creatures.  Thus, to take another easy 
example, it would again be foolish to suggest that God and I bring about the movement of my 
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by itself would be causally sufficient for bringing about their movement, contrary to the central 
thesis of concurrentism, namely, that no finite creature is able bring about its customary effects 
without God’s active assistance within the order of nature.  Although on an ambitious model, 
Berkeley would have to insist that the bodily effects of creatures are typically alternations in the 
flow of perceptions rather than changes in a material world, nothing about this ontological shift 
seems to preclude his agreeing that God and creatures act together in bringing about unified 
alterations through unified actions.   
Finally, later scholastic proponents of concurrentism maintained that—even where God 
and I act through a single action in bringing about a unified effect—it is still possible to 
conceptually trace some aspects of the production of that effect to my nature and some aspects to 
God’s nature or will.  Such a conceptual tracing, or distinguishing, was held to be theologically 
essential in order to explain why, for example, although God and I bring about a unified sinful 
effect through a single action, the responsibility for the effect’s sinfulness rests with me and not 
with God.  One common way of developing this doctrine was to hold that while God’s creation, 
conservation, and concurrence are necessary for the very possibility of the production of 
creaturely effects, his general concurrence is nonetheless tailored to the demands of natural 
powers and the choices of free agents.  Thus, the fact that a particular effect is (say) a heating 
rather than a cooling may be attributed to the nature of the concurring fire rather than to God 
(since if God had concurred with some water, a cooling would have been produced instead).
38  
Likewise, the fact that a particular effect is an instance of sinning rather than an instance of 
virtuous behavior is to be traced back to the will of a finite agent rather than to God (since if God 
had concurred with a virtuous agent, an instance of virtuous behavior would have been produced 
  25instead).
   Once again, although Berkeley would have to understand the ontological nature of the 
relevant effects quite differently, nothing about his idealism precludes him from taking 
advantage of the crucial scholastic strategy of drawing a conceptual distinction between divine 
and creaturely causal contributions.   
 (2) Even if it is granted that Berkeley could adopt much of the scholastic framework for 
thinking about concurrent agency, and avail himself of already developed scholastic responses to 
many familiar difficulties, one might still suppose that the distinction within his system between 
what he often calls “real things” and “chimeras,” and what we might call “objective” and 
“subjective” experiences, precludes his adopting an ambitious model of human agency.  The 
worry here is rooted in the thought that if Berkeley grants that we may directly influence the 
collections of perceptions constituting our bodies, he will not be able to distinguish between 
objective and subjective experiences in terms of involuntary and voluntary control.  For, on an 
ambitious picture, my legs (for example) would seem to be both responsive to my will and 
belong to the objective realm.  Therefore, if it is supposed that “involuntariness must be a 
necessary condition of the reality of Berkeley’s ‘real’ ideas,”
 39 then a robust account of his 
claim that “we move our legs ourselves” would commit him to either denying the reality of our 
bodies, or land him straightaway in a contradiction. 
Although the objection is a serious one, there is a readily available solution: deny the 
assumption that total involuntariness is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for an 
experience’s being objective.  That it should not be reckoned a sufficient condition should be 
clear from our willingness to count even involuntary illusions, hallucinations, and dreams as 
subjective experiences.  There is no reason to suppose that the earthquake experience I had last 
night while dreaming should be deemed objective just in virtue of the fact that it was 
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ways in which we standardly interpret experiences of our own bodies, but also from our ability to 
indirectly influence our experience of the world through the control we enjoy over our bodies, as 
well as by our ability to focus and direct our attention.  The fact that I can typically determine 
whether I see my own hand as open or closed (since I’m the one who typically opens and closes 
it), that I can avoid seeing the tree by shutting my eyes, and that I can direct my attention to the 
sound of the birds and away from the noise of the traffic does not require me to suppose that 
those experiences are merely subjective.  Rather than hold that involuntariness is either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for objective experience, it would thus seem more reasonable 
to treat responsiveness to our volitions as one factor among many upon which we may draw in 
distinguishing between objective and subjective experiences.   
Such a response is, I think, not only a perfectly good answer that is available to Berkeley, 
but in all likelihood his own considered answer as well.  He repeatedly indicates that we enjoy at 
least an indirect control over many of our objective sensory experiences in virtue of our ability to 
influence our own bodies.  Thus, for example, in the Notebooks he writes, “There is somewhat 
active in most perceptions i.e. such as ensue upon our Volitions, such as we can prevent & stop 
v.g I turn my eyes towards the Sun I open them all this is active” (N, 672a; see also Dialogues, 
1:196).  Likewise, even in his canonical statements of the distinction between subjective and 
objective experience, Berkeley implies only that “the ideas perceived by sense, that is real things 
. . . have not a like dependence on our will,” and are at any rate less “dim, irregular and 
confused” than “ideas formed by the imagination” (Dialogues, 3:235, italics added).  Indeed, far 
from resting on a simple distinction based on voluntariness as a necessary and sufficient 
condition, Berkeley smartly insists that “by whatever method you [i.e. the materialist] distinguish 
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it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference, and I am not for depriving you of any one 
thing that you perceive. (Dialogues, 3:235; see also Principles, 29–34).  In letting the distinction 
between “real things” and “chimeras” rest on a broad range of defeasible criteria Berkeley leaves 
open the possibility that we may have a direct causal influence even over aspects of objective 
reality, and in doing so effectively dissolves what would otherwise be an embarrassing objection 
to an ambitious model of human agency.   
  (3) A further worry that might be thought to block the possibility of Berkeley’s 
embracing an ambitious view of human agency arises in connection with his understanding of 
the active-passive distinction.  According to one tempting view, Berkeley is committed to our 
being wholly active with respect to our ideas of imagination and wholly passive with respect to 
our sensory perceptions.  Given such a picture, however, an ability on our part to directly 
influence the movements of our limbs might well seem problematic.  For Berkeley would then 
appear to be committed to holding that we are passive with respect to our perceptions, active 
with respect to our limbs, while nonetheless insisting that our limbs just are collections of 
perceptions.  On pain of committing Berkeley to an inconsistent triad, it might therefore be 
objected that we should not attribute to him any view according to which we might be genuine 
causes with respect to the movements of our bodies.   
As before, however, this objection rests on an ultimately unwarranted simplifying 
assumption.  For the apparent inconsistency arises only if we attribute to Berkeley the view that 
we must be either wholly active or wholly passive with respect to each object of experience.
40  
His carefully worded statements that we are “somewhat active in most perceptions;” that, 
compared with our ideas of imagination, our sensory perceptions (merely) have “not a like 
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as active” gives us good reason to doubt that Berkeley’s considered view is that we must be 
either completely active or completely passive with respect to each particular object of 
experience  (N, 672a; Dialogues, 3:235 emphasis added; Works, 2:293).  Furthermore such an 
assumption—while perhaps initially tempting—is on its face philosophically implausible.  Our 
everyday experience of our own bodies provides one source of counterexamples:  my experience 
of my hand being waved in front of my face would seem to be partly under my control—I can 
move it more quickly, more slowly, or not at all—but also partly not under my control—I cannot 
directly make it appear purple, or pineapple-shaped for example.  In other cases, of course, the 
assumption will be more plausible as for example when we focus on ideas of imagination and 
sensory perceptions of things like my desk, the house across the street, and the sun.  Even then, 
however, the suggestion that we are wholly active or wholly passive with respect to an object of 
thought is probably best treated as a simplification or idealization.  My imaginary experiences 
are usually more fully under my control, but not always, perhaps not ever, wholly under my 
control.  They are often limited by recurring patterns, by my dispositions, and by my prior 
experiences.  Likewise, I am in general more passive with respect to my sensory experiences, but 
not always, and perhaps not ever, wholly passive with respect to them.  My mind and my will 
surely help to shape even the purest of sensory experiences, and, as Berkeley frequently points 
out, I am at least active with respect to them to the extent that I can shut them out altogether by 
averting my gaze, by turning my head, etc.  If, however, it is granted that we are both partially 
active and partially passive with respect to the movements of our own bodies, then the tension 
originally proposed disappears.  Berkeley could hold, for example, that I am maximally (perhaps 
completely) active with respect to my imagining a circus, maximally (perhaps completely) 
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the ideas that constitute my limbs. 
(4) A fourth and final source of worries that might be thought to stand in the way of 
Berkeley’s embracing a more robust view of human agency than almost-occasionalism concerns 
the possibility of causal interactions between finite substances.  Since, on Berkeley’s idealism, 
my limbs will typically be constituted not only by my perceptions but also by the perceptions of 
other finite agents, the proposal that I might be an immediate cause of the movement of my legs 
suggests that I might thereby be an immediate cause of alterations in the perceptions of other 
finite agents.  Although nothing in Berkeley’s conception of causation per se appears to prohibit 
such a consequence,
41 it is tempting to suppose that, for him, one finite creature may influence 
another finite creature only indirectly through God’s mediating activity.  In short, it is tempting 
to suppose that Berkeleyan minds, like Leibnizian monads, either must be, or simply are, 
causally isolated from one another.   
Fortunately, there is a relatively easy way for Berkeley to accommodate the assumption 
of causal isolation while still warding off the specter of almost-occasionalism.  Even if it is taken 
for granted that finite minds cannot immediately act on one another, Berkeley could still insist 
that we enjoy a direct causal influence over our own bodies insofar as they are constituted by our 
own perceptions.  He could thus hold, for example, that when I am said to move my legs myself, 
what I really do, strictly speaking, is immediately influence (with God’s concurrence) my own 
perceptions of my legs, with the alterations of my perceptions in turn serving as occasional 
causes for God’s giving rise to corresponding perceptions in other finite minds.
 42  Although the 
claim that “I move my legs myself” would, on this view, require some philosophical 
interpretation by the learned, there would nonetheless be a firm metaphysical foundation in my 
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way that I am not active with respect to any other body (i.e. in virtue of the fact that I am an 
immediate cause with respect to at least some of the perceptions constituting it).  While the scope 
of human activity on such a model would remain relatively modest, Berkeley could nonetheless 
legitimately maintain that his view differs from occasionalism not only in explicitly making our 
wills active, but also in granting to us an immediate influence over the objective world in virtue 
of our ability to directly influence the movements of our own bodies.  
While Berkeley could thus embrace the causal isolation of finite minds and still 
significantly distance his own view from almost-occasionalism, we might nonetheless wonder if 
he could not go further still and grant to finite minds the ability to immediately influence other 
finite minds in virtue of the immediate causal influence they enjoy over their own bodies.   
Remarkably, in spite of the naturalness of the assumption of causal isolation, nothing in 
Berkeley’s texts or metaphysics obviously commits him to denying that one finite mind might 
directly influence another finite mind—assuming, of course, God’s active concurrence.  In order 
to make this admittedly contentious suggestion more plausible, let us close by briefly taking up 
three considerations that might otherwise appear to speak definitively against it. 
The first is a well-known passage from the Principles which at a first pass appears to 
imply straightforwardly that no finite spirit may influence the perceptions of any other finite 
spirit:   
<ext> 
For, it is evident that in affecting other persons, the will of man has no other object, than 
barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, 
or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator.  He 
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between spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other.  
(Principles, 147) 
</ext> 
On one reading, this passage would strongly suggest that, for Berkeley, my ability to influence 
the perceptions of other finite minds depends entirely upon God’s coordinating activity.  I will 
that my hand go up, and with God’s concurrence, I typically contribute to an alteration in my 
own perceptions.  But, on this reading, that action’s having any effect upon any other finite mind 
requires more than God’s concurrent assistance; it requires his treating the alterations in my 
perceptions as occasions for producing corresponding perceptions in other finite minds.   
  As Robert McKim has pointed out, however, the Principles passage might be read in 
another way.
43  When Berkeley says that it is God alone who “‛upholding all things by the word 
of His power’, maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the 
existence of each other,” he might mean that God must be the total immediate cause of all of our 
perceptions of other finite spirits.  But he could also mean simply that God’s conserving and 
concurring assistance is a necessary condition for finite spirits to act upon one another.  Such a 
reading seems not only consistent with the letter of what Berkeley writes in Principles 147, but 
also with the spirit of its larger message, namely, that “God is known as certainly and 
immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever.”  For on this reading, our experiences of 
other finite creatures would provide evidence for both their existence and God’s, while our 
experiences of the “infinitely more numerous and considerable” effects of nature would provide 
evidence of God’s existence alone.       
  32  The second consideration that might be thought to conclusively block the possibility that 
one finite spirit might immediately influence the perceptions of another is rooted in Berkeley’s 
professed allegiance to commonsense.  For commonsense might be thought to dictate that the 
bodily movements of one finite agent may affect perceptions in another finite agent only 
indirectly:  I waive my hand, immediately cause changes in light patterns, and indirectly cause 
your perception of my hand; I shout, immediately cause a disturbance in the air, and indirectly 
your perception of my words.  For Berkeley, however, the mediating role that might otherwise be 
assigned to physical bodies—air, water, light, etc.—can only be assigned to God’s coordinating 
activity in the world.  One might therefore conclude that, given Berkeley’s idealism, the 
commonsense intuition that I cannot immediately cause perceptions in other finite minds without 
causally intervening in the world forces him to the view that I can only be an occasional cause of 
perceptions in other finite minds.    
   Again, however, the case here is less definitive than it might seem at first pass.
 44  For the 
commonsense intuition that I can only indirectly influence your perceptions gains much of its 
force from the assumption of a materialist ontology.  In a world of mind-independent media and 
objects, the supposition that I might alter your perceptions without altering the common material 
world in which we move, live, and interact is tantamount to postulating something on the order 
of psychokinesis.  And that should indeed strike us as spooky and unintuitive.  If, however, the 
idealist is right, and what we take to be material objects are constituted by perceptions 
immediately perceived by other finite minds, then the intuition that I can only indirectly 
influence your perceptions looks much less compelling.  For if my hand is constituted in part by 
perceptions in the minds of other finite spirits, the claim that I can directly influence your 
perceptions requires nothing more than that I be able to exert a direct influence over the 
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much claim to commonsense as any thesis about our inability to directly influence the 
perceptions of other finite spirits.  The case from commonsense against our being able to 
immediately influence the perceptions of other finite minds in virtue of our being able to 
immediately influence the movements of our own bodies thus turns out to be far less compelling 
than one might have otherwise imagined.   
Finally, it might be thought that Berkeley’s purported rejection of “blind agency” 
precludes the possibility that one finite mind might directly influence the perceptions of another 
finite mind.  As Kenneth Winkler has argued in detail, among Berkeley’s contemporaries it was 
widely held that any volition presupposes a prior cognition of the state of affairs being willed.
45  
Although Berkeley does not explicitly endorse the doctrine of no blind agency in either the 
Principles or the Dialogues, there is textual evidence, especially in the Notebooks, but also in 
Alciphron and Siris, that he found at least some version of it appealing (see, for example, N, 674, 
743, 812, 841–2; Alciphron, VII 18; Siris, 322).     
If the thesis of no blind agency is taken strictly, so that it entails that a finite agent cannot 
will a state of affairs without first having an exact idea of that state of affairs, it will present a 
serious obstacle to immediate causal interaction between finite minds in the Berkeleyan system.  
The crux of the problem lies in the fact that even where two agents have perceptions of the same 
body, they will seldom, perhaps never, have exactly similar perceptions.  To take a typical case, 
when I wave to a friend, I have perceptions, as we would put it, of the back of my hand, while 
my friend has perceptions of the front of my hand.  Even if it is granted that Berkeley’s idealism 
per se allows for the possibility that in moving my hand back and forth I immediately influence 
my friend’s perceptions, the denial of blind agency, when coupled with perceptual variation, 
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about a change in the perceptions of my friend, I would have to first have those exact 
perceptions—or exact ideas of those perceptions—clearly in mind myself.  I would, as it were, 
have to see or imagine my hand from the perspective of my friend.  Given our different 
experiential perspectives, however, it seems that that might never, perhaps even in principle, be 
the case, and so I might never be in a position to immediately influence another finite agent’s 
perceptions of my body.   
While the no blind agency thesis raises an interesting set of concerns with respect to how 
far Berkeley can extend the scope of human agency, we should, I think, be hesitant to attribute a 
strict version of the doctrine to him for at least three related reasons.  First, the textual basis for 
ascribing the thesis of no blind agency to Berkeley is, in fact, quite thin.  While it might 
nonetheless be sufficient for attributing the doctrine in some form or other to Berkeley—
especially in light of its wide acceptance among his contemporaries—his texts clearly do not 
give us a full picture of his understanding of the doctrine, nor how he sees it fitting into his 
philosophical system as a whole.  Second, what Berkeley does tell us suggests that his driving 
interest in the thesis is that the will and understanding not be treated as two distinct and separate 
faculties; he gives no indication that he is drawn to the exceedingly strong position that every 
aspect of every one of our actions must be cognitively transparent to us.  Third, it is clear that, 
even bracketing concerns over causal interactions between finite minds, a strict reading of the no 
blind agency thesis would go too far for Berkeley:  it would not only rule out one finite mind 
immediately influencing another finite mind, but also a single finite mind’s conjuring novel ideas 
of the imagination (since doing so would require the agent to first represent the ideas to be 
imagined, thus launching an infinite regress).
46  There are thus good reasons to suppose that 
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somewhat relaxed version of the no blind agency thesis, one not committed to the sort of 
perspectival omniscience that would otherwise raise such obvious trouble for the possibility of 
causal interactions between finite minds.  Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that, had he 
confronted the issue directly, Berkeley might well have tempered his understanding of the no 
blind agency thesis specifically in the hopes of assigning as wide a scope to human activity as 
any sensible materialist, and capturing, in the most straightforward way available to him, the 
commonsense notion that “we move our legs ourselves.” 
   
Conclusion 
 
Berkeley’s commentators have long seen vacillation and contradiction lurking in his account of 
human agency.  Once his discussion of human agency is placed in its appropriate historical 
context, however, one can see in his texts a consistent endorsement of concurrentism as opposed 
to occasionalism or mere conservationism.  Furthermore, once we appreciate this endorsement, 
we can see why, given other central commitments of his system, he would have resisted 
contemporary efforts to push him towards a thoroughgoing occasionalism.  Finally, reflection on 
his dual commitment to concurrentism and idealism suggests that he might assign a wider—
perhaps a much wider—scope to human agency than has generally been assumed.  Although 
Berkeley does not provide us with a fully explicated philosophy of mind or spirit—that was to be 
the topic of Part II of the Principles—what he does offer us suggests a coherent, philosophically 
interesting, and characteristically subtle view of human agency.       
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